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ABSTRACT. I want to suggest a way of approaching On Certainty that treats what 
Wittgenstein is doing in the notebooks that make up this work as manifesting a kind 
philosophical practice that is broadly Pyrrhonian, at least on one reading of what this involves. 
Such a reading fits with the general philosophical quietism found in Wittgenstein’s work, 
particularly in his later writings, and is also supported by independent textual evidence that he 
was profoundly influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Crucially, however, it also helps to 
clarify the sense in which the Pyrrhonian sceptical techniques, and hence (I claim) the kind of 
philosophical quietism that goes along with them, can have an essentially disquieting effect on 
the subject (which in the sceptical case I dub epistemic vertigo).     
 
 
1. EXEGETICAL ISSUES 
 
Wittgenstein’s final notebooks, published as On Certainty, make for fascinating reading. These four 
notebooks constitute a sustained treatment of questions concerned with knowledge and certainty, 
and with the status of so-called Moorean certainties in particular. As notebooks, the remarks are 
impressionistic, and sometimes contradictory. As such, the notebooks raise all kinds of exegetical 
issues. For example, there is the fact that the first notebook seems to be more concerned with G. 
E. Moore’s remarks on idealism rather than the Moorean certainties that are the primary concern 
of the other three notebooks.1 There is also the issue of the proximal intellectual impetus for these 
notebooks. In their introduction, the editors of this work, Anscombe and von Wright, claim that 
Wittgenstein’s concern was G. E. Moore’s remarks on everyday certainties, at least as those 
remarks were interpreted and responded to by Norman Malcolm, who Wittgenstein stayed with 
around this time. This is certainly the most plausible impetus for these notebooks, but I think that 
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it is at least contentious. In particular, I would suggest that there is an alternative way of thinking 
about these notebooks available that takes the work of John Henry Newman as a more primary 
source.2 
Even granted these exegetical issues, the consensus regarding On Certainty tends to cluster 
around two kinds of proposal. On the one hand, there are those who think that there is a 
canonical reading of what Wittgenstein had in mind in these remarks, whereby Wittgenstein is 
advancing a concrete philosophical thesis (or theses).3 Accordingly, proponents of this view are 
obliged to claim that some of the remarks should not be taken at face-value, in order to preserve 
the overall consistency of the notebooks. Given that we are dealing with notebooks which were 
unedited by the man himself, and never intended for publication, this is an entirely plausible line to 
take. Indeed, one would find it surprising if a set of notebooks didn’t contain apparent 
inconsistencies. Moreover, there is also the point that it is undeniable that Wittgenstein often 
explores ideas in his notebooks without ever explicitly advertising this fact. Accordingly, where 
remarks don’t fit with the wider interpretation, there is always the option to maintain that 
Wittgenstein isn’t advancing the claims that he seems to be putting forward in the problematic 
passages. 
Still, while one can plausibly derive a consistent proposal from the notebooks that make 
up On Certainty, since they are unedited notebooks it is hardly surprising that there are many 
commentators who eschew the task of offering an overarching interpretation and content 
themselves instead with the much weaker goal of presenting a position that is merely inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s remarks. This leaves the further question of whether Wittgenstein himself would 
endorse the position so described as at least not settled.4 Indeed, in some cases, commentators 
who fall into this camp go so far as to suggest that their Wittgensteinian proposal is not one that 
they think Wittgenstein himself would endorse.5 
 I want to explore a different way of thinking about these notebooks, which does not fall 
into either camp. This is the idea that Wittgenstein might have been undertaking a kind of 
intellectual exercise that is broadly Pyrrhonian in spirit. In particular, the thought is that he isn’t 
trying to advance philosophical theses in these works at all, but rather working through opposing 
arguments as a means of cultivating within himself a kind of sceptical attitude. Recall that 
Pyrrhonism was an ethical stance, in the sense that it was offering a radical conception of the life 
of flourishing, one on which the sceptical attitude was required for eudaimonia.6 This was achieved 
via the sceptical modes. These were designed to create an opposition (isosethenia) that engenders a 
neutral attitude (epoche) which, in turn¾at least if the process is repeated enough times 
anyway¾eventually leads to a tranquil and untroubled state of mind (ataraxia). Sceptical doubt is 
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thus in the service of the good life. Could Wittgenstein be attempting something similar with his 
notebooks? 
 This way of thinking about On Certainty would certainly be very different from those 
proposals that maintain that Wittgenstein was advancing a particular philosophical thesis. After all, 
on this reading, Wittgenstein is not meant to be understood as advancing any kind of 
philosophical thesis. He is, instead, like the Pyrrhonians before him, simply manifesting a certain 
kind of approach to philosophical issues, without endorsing any particular claim. Relatedly, if one 
took this line about On Certainty, then it would be a mistake to set aside the general exegetical 
question of what Wittgenstein is up to in these notebooks and instead focus on a particular train 
of thought that one could plausibly take to be inspired by them. That’s not to say that the 
Wittgenstein-inspired view would be lacking in philosophical import. Rather, the point is that one 
would be missing something very significant about On Certainty by not recognizing the distinctive 
philosophical approach that Wittgenstein is manifesting in this text.  
There are some points that count in favour of this way of thinking about On Certainty. We 
know that Wittgenstein was deeply interested in Pyrrhonian scepticism, and was very influenced by 
the work of the Austro-Hungarian (near) contemporary Fritz Mauthner who was attempting to 
develop an updated version of the Pyrrhonian stance.7 Indeed, it is arguable that Pyrrhonian 
scepticism informs all of Wittgenstein’s work (going right back to the Tractatus), though I will 
focus my attentions to its influence on On Certainty. In addition, reading On Certainty this way 
means that we don’t need to explain away the apparent contradictions in these notebooks. Instead, 
the contradictions could be treated as being instead evidence in favour of this interpretation; as 
Wittgenstein generating the kind of opposition needed to fuel his Pyrrhonian stance. Indeed, there 
are also some interesting overlaps between what Wittgenstein seems to be attempting in On 
Certainty (on this reading anyway) and the practices of Pyrrhonism, at least on a plausible 
interpretation of the latter. Moreover, reading On Certainty this way enables us to better understand 
the specific kind of philosophical quietism that Wittgenstein seems to be embracing in his 
philosophical method, one that is also in a certain important sense disquieting. I will be explaining 
this feature of the view in terms of the phenomenon of epistemic vertigo. Finally, and relatedly, 
although this Pyrrhonian way of reading On Certainty diverges from the two interpretative camps 
noted above, it does have some affinities with the influential ‘therapeutic’ way of thinking about 
Wittgenstein’s work in general, whereby we are not to understand what Wittgenstein is doing (e.g., 
in the Tractatus) as defending philosophical theses.8 
Before we jump into considering these issues, however, I first want to register the spirit in 
which this enterprise is being undertaken. My claim is only that this is a fruitful way of thinking 
about On Certainty, and no more than that. That’s a weak claim, from an exegetical point of view, 
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to be sure. But it also has a hidden strength. For if this claim is true, then the import of thinking 
about On Certainty in this fashion would survive even the unearthing of definitive evidence that this 
is not what Wittgenstein intended with these notebooks (e.g., a letter from him, written at the 
time, that explicitly disavows this possibility). On Certainty is an important philosophical work, and 
what such works have in common is that they can inspire interesting philosophical ideas that 
diverge from what the author intended. In any case, in what follows my primary motivation is to 
persuade the reader that this way of responding to On Certainty is philosophically enlightening, 
regardless of whether it turns out to be an accurate representation of Wittgenstein’s motives 
behind this work.9   
 
 
2. PYRRHONISM AS PERPETUAL INQUIRY  
 
There is a common way of thinking about Pyrrhonism according to which it involves a rejection 
of the demands of rationality. Indeed, such a reading can seem obvious given that this is a form of 
scepticism, albeit one that is cast as an ethical stance. As Michael Williams (1988, 561-2) once 
provocatively described the view, one can think of Pyrrhonism as a kind of inversion of Stoicism. 
While the Stoics (very roughly) thought that the good life, the life of flourishing, involved 
suppressing the passions and living by reason, the Pyrrhonians were effectively advocating that 
one should suppress reason so that one can live by the passions (though they obviously would 
never put it in this way, since it is part of the Pyrrhonian stance that one wouldn’t advocate a 
theoretical claim of this kind). It is thus reason, or at least the desire to present oneself as rational, 
that is problematic in terms of living the good life.10 The sceptical modes are thus a means to an 
end (bearing in mind that we are taking an external perspective on Pyrrhonism here, in that they 
themselves advance no ends, and thus no means to ends either), in that they are designed to 
provoke a response, over time, such that one relinquishes rational inquiry altogether and 
acquiesces in non-voluntary responses to stimuli. 
 While this is certainly a plausible way of thinking about Pyrrhonian scepticism—and note 
that the exegetical issues surrounding Wittgenstein’s relatively recent, historically speaking, 
notebooks are magnified several times when it comes to the relevant ancient texts—I don’t think 
it is really true to how Sextus Empiricus, who is our key source when it comes to Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, describes the stance. Right at the very beginning of Outlines of Pyrrhonism (SE 3), for 
example, Sextus emphasises a crucial difference between, on the one hand, the Dogmatists and the 
Academic sceptics—who, respectively, “have claimed to have discovered the truth” and “have 
asserted that it cannot be apprehended”—and, on the other hand, the Pyrrhonian sceptics who 
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simply “go on inquiring.” If we take this description of Pyrrhonism seriously, then we are led to a 
conception of this stance whereby it isn’t rejecting reason altogether, but rather rejecting a 
particular conception of rationality that embraces closed inquiries, whether in the positive sense of 
generating putative knowledge or the negative sense of generating (settled) doubt. The thought is 
that either outcome is contrary to the good life of human flourishing. In contrast, the Pyrrhonian 
skeptical attitude is meant to promote a genuinely open inquiry, one that would thereby be 
perpetually ongoing. In this way we have a model for thinking about Pyrrhonian scepticism 
whereby it embodies a rational perspective of sorts, albeit one that is principally opposed to 
reaching dialectically closed conclusions. 
It is also significant that the passage just cited is fairly representative of how Sextus 
describes Pyrrhonian scepticism. For example, after describing the ethical goal of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism as being “quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of 
things unavoidable” (SE I 19), he goes on to contrast the “quietude” gained by living the sceptical 
life with the “disquietude” of those who do not suspend judgement:  
 
“For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted; when 
he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things 
naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, he thinks, good; which when he has 
obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate 
elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavour to avoid losing the things 
which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally 
good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.” 
(SE I 19)  
 
Again, then, we find that the sceptical good life of quietude is not fuelled by doubt as such (i.e., a 
settled conviction that one lacks knowledge), much less the suspension of all rational inquiry, but 
rather results from keeping the flames of inquiry alight, where this means ensuring that nothing is 
‘determined’, whether positively (in the manner of Dogmatism) or negatively (in the manner of 
Academic scepticism).11  
 Indeed, it is arguable that by treating Pyrrhonism as a form of scepticism as we now 
understand that term, and hence as directed at bringing about doubt, we are implicitly appealing to 
a conception of scepticism that would be alien to the Pyrrhonians themselves (but which, for 
example, is very present in later forms of scepticism, such as Cartesian scepticism and its ‘method 
of doubt’). Skepsis, after all, means inquiry rather than doubt. Moreover, doubt is too much like a 
settled conclusion for Pyrrhonian tastes. What they regard continual inquiry as generating is not 
the settled negative conclusion of doubt (e.g., regarding the possibility of knowledge in the target 
domain), which would be one, negative, way of concluding a rational inquiry, but rather the more 
unsettled suspension of judgement, something which could in turn generate further inquiry, and so on 
ad infinitum. On this reading, then, Pyrrhonism is to be thought of as a way of living, whereby the 
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employment of the sceptical modes will keep one’s judgements suspended and hence ensure that 
inquiry is forever on-going.12 
 This way of thinking about Pyrrhonian scepticism also dovetails with another exegetical 
question about the stance, which is what the sceptical modes were aimed at. If the scope is any 
and all of one’s beliefs, then that would suggest a radical form of scepticism. With the scope so 
broad, the traditional problem for Pyrrhonism of explaining how it offers a psychologically 
possible sceptical strategy would be acute.13 But this isn’t a very credible way of understanding the 
stance. This is because Pyrrhonism doesn’t seem to be concerned with ordinary spontaneous belief 
at all, but rather with the kind of (putatively) rationally grounded theoretical claims that are 
characteristically not like ordinary, unreflective, spontaneous beliefs. Indeed, in the most 
straightforward case, these rationally grounded theoretical claims are the claims made by the 
philosopher. Here is Robert Fogelin on this point: 
 
“[…] the attacks of the Pyrrhonian skeptic are directed against the dogmas of ‘Professors’¾not 
the beliefs of common people […] the Pyrrhonian skeptic leaves common beliefs, unpretentiously 
held, alone.” (Fogelin 2004, 163) 
 
This point is sometimes expressed in terms of two styles of assent: one that is theoretical, 
putatively rational, non-spontaneous, and dogmatic (and so subject to sceptical doubt); and one 
that is ordinary, unreflective, spontaneous, and non-dogmatic (and hence avoids sceptical doubt). 
Here, for example, is how Williams expresses the idea of a style of assent that is immune to 
Pyrrhonian doubt: 
 
“[…] the Pyrrhonian has a distinctive style of assent: spontaneous, involuntary submission to his 
unrationalised impulses. Assent is a pathos, something that comes over one. […] Ordinary life, as 
Sextus sees it, is much more a matter of impulse and habit than of judgement properly so called.” 
(Williams 1988, 561-2) 
 
Again, we see why our ordinary unreflective judgements should be thought of as not the target of 
sceptical challenge.14  
This way of characterizing the scope of Pyrrhonian scepticism accords with our earlier 
presentation of it in terms of perpetual inquiry. Our ordinary, spontaneous, unreflective beliefs are 
perfectly in order as they are, in the sense that they do not generate the disquiet that the 
Pyrrhonian sceptical modes are designed to treat. It is only once we begin making judgements of 
the problematic kind that we are led into disquiet, and away from eudaimonia. The sceptical modes 
are then needed to tackle this form of disquiet and bring about a certain kind of peace. But notice 
that the quietude that results from the employment of these sceptical techniques is not to be 
thought of in terms of a settled stance of its own. Indeed, this is the sense in which there can be 
no peace once one takes up inquiry, since the path to flourishing is now continual inquiry. Put 
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another way, while there is quietude of sorts, it is of a completely different kind to the ‘quietude’ 
available to those who unreflectively live their lives, in that it is active rather than passive (for there 
is something that needs to be quieted).  
This interpretation of Pyrrhonian scepticism suggests that the successful application of the 
sceptical modes does not return one to a state of intellectual innocence, of a kind available to the 
unreflective. This point is crucial, since it entails that the Pyrrhonian strategy is not to be 
understood as undoing anything. Indeed, one could claim that the eudaimonia that result from 
employing this strategy is of a higher order, given its active nature, though this would bring 
difficulties of its own. (For example, how are we to mark this greater value, given that there is no 
philosophical thesis in play here that we can appeal to?)15 In any case, for our purposes what is 
important is just that the Pyrrhonian sceptical modes are targeted at a particular kind of theoretical 
claim, that they lead to perpetual inquiry (i.e., rather than a settled state, including one of doubt), 
and that the eudaimonia that results is thereby by its nature also in one sense unsettling/disquieting, 
as distinct from the kind of eudaimonia available to those who are essentially unreflective.  
 
 
3. WITTGENSTEINIAN QUIETISM 
 
The conception of Pyrrhonian scepticism just presented aligns closely with the specific brand of 
philosophical quietism that Wittgenstein expresses, and which is most apparent in his later works, 
like the Philosophical Investigations and (I would say, especially) On Certainty.16 In its most austere form, 
philosophical quietism simply holds that there is nothing to be gained from engaging in 
philosophical reflection, and hence that it should be abandoned. This is clearly not Wittgenstein’s 
view, as he practiced philosophy right until the end of his life. But he evidently does regard 
philosophical problems as being in a certain sense illusory. Indeed, he maintains that philosophy is 
the source of philosophical problems. Nonetheless, he makes clear that philosophy—at least of 
the kind that he practices—is also the way to resolve them. (“To show the fly the way out of 
the fly bottle.” (Wittgenstein 1953, §309)) Wittgensteinian philosophical quietism thus sees 
philosophy as playing an important role in resolving philosophical difficulties, in contrast to a 
more austere form of philosophical quietism whereby philosophy could serve no useful purpose.17  
In order to understand Wittgenstein’s philosophical quietism, however, it is important to 
recognise that Wittgenstein regards philosophy as a certain kind of activity, rather than involving 
the advancement of philosophical theses.18 In particular, Wittgenstein doesn’t resolve 
philosophical problems by putting forward philosophical theses of his own (which would 
obviously be in tension with his philosophical quietism). Rather, his philosophical approach 
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involves showing how the philosophical puzzle in hand is illusory by constant engagement with 
the phenomena in hand, by focussing on the details of cases and so forth.  
We can bring this point out by considering one of the core lines of thought that is found 
in On Certainty. In the notebooks that make up this work Wittgenstein is clearly showing the 
illusory nature of a philosophical puzzle regarding knowledge (Cartesian scepticism, in short), by 
teasing out how it rests on the implicit import of a philosophical conception of the structure of 
rational evaluation that should be abandoned.19 This is in contrast to the actual structure of 
rational evaluation found in our everyday epistemic practices, misdescribed by the philosopher, 
which are shown (through adducing many examples) to be entirely in order as they are. In a 
nutshell, what Wittgenstein demonstrates in On Certainty is that the traditional epistemological 
project of defending knowledge from sceptical attack presupposes, like the Cartesian form of 
scepticism that it is responding to, that there can be such a thing as universal rational evaluations. 
In contrast, Wittgenstein highlights how our ordinary practices of rational evaluation tacitly 
incorporate what he calls hinge commitments, which are essentially arational commitments that 
enable rational evaluations and hence are not themselves subject to rational evaluation.20 
Moreover, he makes clear that it is in the nature of rational evaluations that they involve hinge 
commitments in this way, and hence that this is not an incidental feature of our system of rational 
evaluations.  
It follows that the philosophical problem of radical scepticism (of showing that knowledge 
is impossible), along with the traditional philosophical response to radical scepticism (of showing 
that knowledge is possible), is based on a faulty picture of the nature of our rational evaluations, 
one that illicitly imports a problematic conception of these rational evaluations as being, 
potentially anyway, harmlessly universal. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s philosophical reflections help 
us to understand that our everyday epistemic practices, which have hinge commitments at their 
heart, are entirely in order as they are. He is thus offering what I have elsewhere called an 
undercutting response to the philosophical paradox involved in Cartesian scepticism, whereby what 
looks like a genuine philosophical paradox is shown to rest on illicit philosophical assumptions 
that should be abandoned. Our ordinary epistemic practices are fine as they are, with the apparent 
philosophical puzzle arising not out of these practices at all, but rather from a problematic 
philosophical account of those practices, one that we need to abandon. Undercutting responses to 
philosophical paradoxes are to be contrasted with overriding responses which effectively concede 
the paradoxical nature of the puzzle in hand (and thus there is something genuinely amiss with our 
everyday practices in the relevant respects), but nonetheless maintain that we can revise our 
everyday practices in certain respects in order to deal with the paradox.21 
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Notice, however, that it is crucial to Wittgenstein’s approach that he is showing how we 
should deal with philosophical puzzles rather than advancing an opposing philosophical thesis. 
This is a natural consequence of his stance, for recall that he is trying to make clear how our 
everyday epistemic practices are fine as they are, and thus that the philosophical puzzlement 
arising from those practices is in fact the result of philosophical theses being smuggled into the 
description of them (a ‘false philosophical picture’). The relentless focus on examples helps us to 
see that what we thought was a genuine philosophical puzzle about our everyday epistemic 
practices was in fact nothing of the kind. Wittgenstein shows that the puzzle is illusory not by 
arguing directly that this is the case, but rather by focussing on the nature of our everyday 
epistemic practices in such a fashion that we can come to understand how those practices can be 
in order as they are.  
This is why there is nowhere in the notebooks that make up On Certainty a clear statement 
of a view (even though we can easily extract such a statement on his behalf, as indeed we just did). 
This is not an incidental lack, but part-and-parcel of the philosophical enterprise that Wittgenstein 
is engaging in, which does not involve the advancement of philosophical theses, but rather 
concerns a kind of philosophical therapy. There is thus a world of difference between, on the one 
hand, showing how a philosophical inquiry can undercut a putative philosophical paradox and, on 
the other hand, advancing a concrete philosophical thesis. The former can lead to quietude for 
those perplexed by the philosophical puzzle in play (I claim it can lead to disquietude too, as I 
explain below). But if philosophy, in the sense of advancing philosophical theses, is the source of 
philosophical puzzles, then it is important to ensure that in offering the former one is not tempted 
into thereby offering the latter too, and hence being sucked back into the very faulty philosophical 
enterprise that was generating the fake conundra in the first place. 
 
 
4. EPISTEMIC VERTIGO 
 
That Wittgenstein isn’t advancing philosophical theses in On Certainty removes one key potential 
inconsistency between his philosophical stance in this work and that offered by Pyrrhonian 
scepticism (which clearly does bring the sceptical modes to bear on the advancement of 
philosophical theses). But there is a second element of Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach that 
is centrally important to this way of understanding On Certainty, and more generally to 
understanding the particular brand of philosophical quietism that he (and, arguably, Pyrrhonism) 
represents. This is that it is part of the very style of philosophical quietism that Wittgenstein offers 
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that it is in a certain sense also deeply disquieting. Elsewhere I have characterised this point via the 
notion of epistemic vertigo.22 
One thing that we should remember about Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical 
therapy is that it is explicitly designed to help those who are already subject to philosophical 
difficulties. In short, it is directed at treating the afflicted. Those who have never succumbed to 
philosophical concerns will find no use in these reflections, which will simply seem strange and 
affected. Moreover, since there is nothing philosophically amiss with our ordinary beliefs on the 
Wittgensteinian conception, hence there is nothing for philosophical theorizing to contribute to 
their lives anyway. Note that we saw earlier that something very similar is true of the Pyrrhonian 
sceptical modes, at least on one way of understanding that form of scepticism, such that its target 
was not ordinary unreflective beliefs at all, but rather the kind of theoretical claims 
characteristically made by the philosopher.  
 It is a crucial feature of Wittgenstein’s account of hinge commitments that we are 
ordinarily completely unaware of these commitments and the special role that they play in our 
everyday epistemic practices. This is something that Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasises with his 
examples. One is not taught that one has two hands, for example (much less that one knows this), 
but rather that one can do things with one hands, the existence of one’s hands being part of the 
accepted backdrop of certainty against which one evaluates other specific claims that are raised. 
(OC, §153) If one does not ordinarily encounter hinge commitments qua hinge commitments, and 
the nature of their epistemic status is raised only in a philosophical context, then it follows that the 
epistemic status of hinge commitments is not something that is at issue in ordinary contexts. As 
Wittgenstein puts it at one point, the hinge commitments “lie apart from the route travelled by 
inquiry.” (OC, §88) 
 What Wittgenstein demonstrates with his examples is that there is nothing at all 
epistemically amiss in our everyday use of hinge commitments, and that it only seems that there is 
because we have bought into a faulty philosophical picture (one that is not licensed by our 
everyday practices at all) according to which there can be universal rational evaluations. Our 
everyday epistemic practices are thus revealed to be entirely in order as they are. But notice an 
important difference between philosophers and the rest of the folk once this point is made. Those 
who are unselfconsciously engaged in these everyday epistemic practices, and hence are (rightly) 
unaware of the role that hinge commitments play in those practices, will also be accordingly 
unaware of why this challenge to the legitimacy of these practices is unsound. But our situation, as 
philosophers, is very different. We have adopted (or at least attempted to adopt, anyway) the 
disengaged philosophical stance and have accordingly become aware of our hinge commitments 
and the role that they play. This discovery cannot be unlearnt. It means that even after coming to 
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recognise that there is nothing amiss in our having hinge commitments, we cannot return to the 
state of epistemic innocence prior to their recognition.   
 Even in the grip of an adequate philosophical understanding of our epistemic position, 
then—one that in the most important sense “leaves everything as it is.” (Wittgenstein 1953, 
§I.124), since it demonstrates that the everyday practices in question are unproblematic—one is 
nonetheless destined to take an ‘unnatural’ perspective on it. This is where the epistemic vertigo 
comes in. In becoming disengaged from our everyday epistemic practices, and thereby taking a 
detached perspective on them such that we can recognise our hinge commitments for what they 
are, one is naturally made intellectually uneasy, even if one is persuaded by the fact that these 
practices, and thus the arationality of our hinge commitments, is perfectly in order. We are now 
fated to be aware, as Stanley Cavell (1988) memorably put it, of the ‘uncanniness of the ordinary.’ 
That vertigo is a phobic reaction is important here: epistemic vertigo is not the same as the 
epistemic angst that the radical sceptical problem gives rise to, as the latter concerns an anxiety about 
the legitimacy of our ordinary epistemic practices. For once the sceptical problem has been 
dissolved, and these practices are shown to be in order as they are, then there is no longer any 
impetus for such angst. But just as one can recognise, while high up, that one is perfectly safe and 
yet have a phobic reaction to heights nonetheless, so one can recognise, from a detached 
intellectual perspective, that there is nothing epistemically amiss with our hinge commitments 
being arational and yet feel a deep sense of epistemic insecurity regardless.23  
 The phenomenon of epistemic vertigo generalises. If philosophical problems more 
generally rest on illicit philosophical claims, of a kind that are produced by adopting a detached 
perspective that hides salient features of our actual practices, then one will expect a corresponding 
vertigo effect to occur as regards these other philosophical puzzles also. Once the disengaged 
stance is adopted, and one comes to see how features of our practices function in ways that were 
hitherto hidden, then even though one might further come to understand how these features of 
our practices are unproblematic, one can nonetheless no longer return to a philosophically 
innocent state where these features of our practices are once again tacit.24  
In any case, what is relevant for our purposes is that a Wittgensteinian quietism, while in a 
sense leaving everything as it is, is also fundamentally disquieting. The positive effect of the 
quietism is the recognition that the philosophical challenge in play is illusory. But there is also an 
important negative effect too, in that one cannot simply return to one’s old practices as before 
because one has now come to recognise, from the detached perspective of philosophical inquiry, 
those features of one’s everyday practices that are ordinarily left hidden. There is thus no return to 
a state of philosophical innocence, prior to engagement with this problem. One is instead left in a 
kind of intellectual exile. Wittgensteinian quietism treats the afflicted, in the sense that it shows 
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them how our everyday practices are not subject to the philosophical challenges that we thought 
they were. But it does not offer a way back from the intellectual exile prompted by their attempt to 
adopt the disengaged philosophical perspective, as there is no cure for this affliction.  
 
 
5. WITTGENSTEINIAN PYRRHONISM 
 
Let’s review where we are with regard to understanding what a specifically Wittgensteinian brand 
of Pyrrhonism would look like. One immediate worry, relating to how Wittgenstein seems to put 
forward philosophical theses in response to the problem of radical scepticism has been dealt with, 
since properly understood he is doing nothing of the kind. Wittgenstein’s approach to 
philosophical problems is not to advance philosophical theses, but to manifest a certain kind of 
activity. We have also seen how Wittgensteinian quietism, while in a sense leaving our everyday 
practices exactly as they are, also has an intellectually unsettling effect on the practitioner. On the 
one hand, the quietism leads the practitioner away from the philosophical angst that the problem in 
hand was generating. But on the other hand, however, this doesn’t lead the practitioner back to a 
state of intellectual innocence, prior to her engagement with the philosophical problem in hand. 
Rather it generates a new kind of unsettling state—philosophical vertigo—whereby the 
practitioner is aware of the fact that our everyday practices are not subject to the philosophical 
challenge posed for them while also now being unavoidably cognisant of intellectually unsettling 
features of those practices that are ordinarily hidden from view. The result is that one is now in a 
certain sense alienated from this practice.  
 Wittgensteinian quietism, so construed, may appear to be a rather dispiriting stance to take. 
But once we view this form of quietism through the lens of Pyrrhonian scepticism, then the 
outlook changes considerably. Recall that the favoured interpretation of the latter is as generating a 
permanently open-ended inquiry, one that is no more inclined towards doubt than it is towards 
claims to knowledge, where this is serving the ethical goal of generating quietude, and thereby 
eudaimonia. The sceptical modes are thus designed not to promote doubt, but to keep inquiry 
ongoing. The modes, recall, are not aimed at ordinary unreflective belief but at the very different 
kinds of reflective claims that depart from the ordinary, with philosophical claims being the 
clearest example of these. It is the latter that are contrary to eudaimonia, and must be opposed. The 
former, in contrast, are not disquieting in the relevant sense, and so are no barrier to eudaimonia. 
The proper application of the modes, however, does not return one back to ordinary unreflective 
belief, but rather enable one, as a reflective subject, to gain quietude through engagement in 
perpetual sceptical inquiry.  
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 The parallels with Wittgensteinian quietism should be obvious. Just as the Pyrrhonian 
sceptical modes are not aimed at our everyday beliefs, so those who have not engaged with 
philosophical problems, and so are not excised by them, have no need of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical therapy, and hence no need for the undercutting anti-scepticism that he presents. 
Since Wittgenstein’s philosophical quietism does not consist in the advocacy of philosophical 
theses—but is rather, like Pyrrhonian scepticism itself, a kind of philosophical activity—it is not in 
tension with the Pyrrhonian sceptical modes (which would be naturally applied to the defence of 
philosophical claims). Crucially, however, neither Wittgensteinian quietism nor Pyrrhonian 
scepticism are geared towards leading the philosophically engaged subject back to a state of 
innocence prior to their entanglement with philosophical concerns—this is simply not the kind of 
quietude that they offer.  
For the Pyrrhonian, the road to eudaimonia for such a subject involves perpetual inquiry, 
and hence essentially involves a kind of intellectual disquietude, of a kind that can drive inquiry. 
One can now regard the Wittgensteinian quietist, in a Pyrrhonian spirit, as utilising philosophical 
vertigo to disquiet the philosophical subject and thereby keep the flames of inquiry alight. This is 
very clear in the case of the specifically epistemic vertigo at issue in On Certainty. Epistemic vertigo 
is the result of being aware of the (ordinarily tacit) role of arational hinge commitments in our 
epistemic practises, even while recognising that the philosophical challenges to those practices is 
based on faulty philosophy. The awareness of the hinge commitments prevents one from 
participating in those everyday practices as one did prior to engaging in philosophy, even now that 
one recognises that they are entirely in order as they are. It also means that one is aware of the 
essentially localised nature of rational evaluations, and that acts as a guard against the impetus 
towards philosophical dogmatism (indeed, dogmatism generally).    
Epistemic vertigo—indeed, philosophical vertigo more generally—is thus a means towards 
generating the kind of isosethenia that would lead to epoche. In this way, Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism, 
and the particular brand of quietism that goes along with it, is neither about advancing 
philosophical claims nor about eschewing philosophical inquiry altogether, but rather involves 
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